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THE NEXT ‘GREAT TRANSFORMATION’ OF MARKETS AND STATES IN THE
TRANSNATIONAL SPACE: GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
& FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION
Abstract: It is a well-known and much explored fact that capital market regulation has had a 
larger share of activity and visible success within the process of European integration than the 
long-standing efforts towards the establishment of harmonized rules in the area of corporate 
governance. While a unified, harmonized or effective market-wide corporate governance regime 
was identified early on as one of the building blocks of the European project, the historically 
grown, path-dependent varieties in national corporate law systems proved – for the longest time 
– resistant to ambitious Europeanization efforts. This paper argues that precisely at the time
when companies’ financing structures were being adapted to globally available and moveable 
capital, corporate governance rules came under immense pressure to address the interests of 
world-wide operating investors, and that this development resulted in a dis-embedding of the 
corporation. The corporation at the end of the 20th century was no longer primarily seen as an 
organizational entity, but had become a financial vehicle, operating in a regulatory framework 
largely out of control of domestic company law legislation. This emerging regulatory 
environment consists of supra-national legislation directed at increased efficiency of regional and 
global financial markets on the one hand and increasingly incentive-oriented, indirect regulation 
of corporate governance rules, placed to a large degree within the discretion of market actors. 
The financialization of corporate governance and the emergence of a transnational legal pluralist 
regime of applicable rules and standards provides a particular challenge to Karl Polanyi’s 
identified ‘double movement’ in the regulation of increasingly disembedded markets.  
And, yet, this is only the first of two analytical steps that must be made to understand the present 
regulatory challenge. As the study of capital market law and corporate governance in the 
European Union illustrates, the emerging regimes cannot adequately be represented as either 
national or international. As they are both and yet neither exclusively, the represent examples of 
what Saskia Sassen calls ‘global assemblages’ and what I shall here study as transnational legal 
pluralism. While Sassen’s concept provides for a powerful illustration of the autonomy of self-
constituting spaces that comprise human, institutional and technological, digital elements, this 
framework needs to be complemented by a specifically legal perspective on the evolving forms 
of regulatory approaches and instruments that are present here.  
Keywords: European Corporate Law, Financial Market Regulation, Corporate Governance, 
Varieties of Capitalism, Embeddedness, Global Assemblages, Legal Pluralism, Transnational 
Law. 





Canada Research Chair in the Transnational and Comparative Law 
of Corporate Governance 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. 
Director, Critical Research Laboratory in Law & Society 
www.criticalresearchlab.org 
Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca 
THE NEXT ‘GREAT TRANSFORMATION’ OF MARKETS AND STATES IN 
THE TRANSNATIONAL SPACE: GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES OF CORPORATE 




In midst a rapidly unfolding and spreading financial crisis, which many hold to be the worst 
since the Great Depression of 19291, scholarly assessments of market regulatory instruments are 
prone to be highly volatile, experimental in nature at best. Not particularly well equipped to quip 
about ‘I told you so’s2 or ‘I should have known’s3, lawyers, working in the primarily affected 
areas of banking and securities regulation, corporate governance and accounting, find themselves 
struggling with contradicting evidence from ‘experts’ right and left.  Much of the retrospective 
wisdom presented by economists, accountants and market analysts, turns on the in/predictability 
of the current situation and there seems to be a collective, if increasingly coy4 remembering of 
the exaltation and ‘irrational exuberance’ of times and actions not so long ago. Those that have 
° Paper prepared for the ‘The Social Embeddedness of Transnational Markets’ Workshop in Bremen, 5-7 February 
2009, jointly organized by the Collaborative Research Centre 597 “Transformations of the State” and the ReCon 
Project WP 9 [http://www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/BremenFeb09.html]  
* Canada Research Chair in the Transnational and Comparative Law of Corporate Governance, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, Toronto. Director, Critical Research Laboratory in Law & Society 
(www.criticalresearchlab.org), and the Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Network 
(www.comparativeresearch.net).  Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
1 P. Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (Norton, 2009), 4; Barry Grey, ‘Worst 
week for global markets since 1929’, www.wsws.org, 11 October 2008: 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/oct2008/glec-o11.shtml; ‘Harper calls crisis worst since 1929’, The Toronto 
Star, www.thestar.com, 22 November 2008, http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/541832 ; Henryk Broder, 
‘Portrait Otmar Issing Neuer Kanzlerberater: “Schlimmste Krise seit 1929” In der Hauptrolle der Bundespräsident’, 
Der Tagesspiegel, 21 October 2008, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/kommentare/;art141,2641082; Jean-
François Barbe, ‘La pire recession depuis 1929?’, Les Affaires, 29 July 2008, http://www.lesaffaires. 
iucom/article/0/economie/2008-07-29/480591/la-pire-reteacutecession-depuis-1929.fr.html; Ramon Marimon, ‘Del 
‘crash’ de 1929 a la crisis de 2008’, El Pais, 12 January 2009, 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/opinion/crash/1929/crisis/2008/elpepuopi/20090112elpepiopi_11/Tes 
2 For those, see R. J. Shiller, The Subprime Solution. How Today's Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to 
do About it (Princeton University Press, 2008), or G. Soros, The New Financial Paradigm. The Credit Crisis of 2008 
and What It Means (Public Affairs, 2008) 
3 Edmund L. Andrews, “Greenspan ‘shocked’ that free markets are flawed”, International Herald Tribune, 23 
October 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/23/business/gspan.php  






not (yet) lost house or job but instead, enjoy the privilege of observing and interpreting these 
‘interesting times’5, find themselves pondering, it seems, about responsibilities for the 
emphatically embraced views that, for example, house prices could only rise, or that markets 
could provide not only sufficient incentives to managers to keep stock performance on an 
upward surge but also provide for the necessary oversight and control. It is within these 
confinements that current thinking yearningly looks to the past, gloomily observes the present 
and – in a strangely heartened and resolved manner – sets out to dream up the future. And it is in 
the centre of the current attempts to address, explain and overcome the crisis, that conceptual and 
institutional suggestions are running high. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose? 
 
Conceptually, of the contenders competing for attention in this future-building exercise, 
‘systemic risk management’ appears to come out ahead. While ‘risk’ is not an alien concept to 
law6, its legal treatment poses a particular challenge to legal theory: en lieu of a general legal 
theory of risk that would necessarily always reflect a particular interpretation of law in general7, 
different legal areas have – over time – been dealing with risk in highly specialized, concrete 
forms.8 The notion of risk is of crucial importance in the present inquiry into the nature of the 
crisis and the adequacy of possible responses. It serves as a reminder that instead of being asked 
to devise a regulatory scheme modeled on a simple cause-effect analysis of the current crisis, any 
regulatory response will have to embrace the particular nature of risk that underlies and informs 
the present situation. The risks that lie at the heart of the current inquiry into the crisis present a 
particular set of challenges. In fact, the evidence is too strong that the current situation grows out 
of a larger complex of contributing elements, which are not adequately squeezed beneath the 
sub-prime & mortgage collapse alone. Financial innovation, as it skyrocketed over the last 
decades, a development that had begun hundreds of years ago with the brazen invention of 
insurance schemes9, set free a truly mind-boggling sphere of risk-taking opportunities. Taking 
stock today, mortgage lending, while tremendously concentrated and over-heated and thus prone 
                                                
5 Alex Tokarev, ‘Interesting Times’, WORLDmag.com, Commentary, 30 December 2008, 
http://online.worldmag.com/2008/12/30/interesting-times/; see also George Packer’s wonderful reminiscence on 
Edmund Wilson’s Great Depression journalism in The New Yorker, ‘Edmund Wilson on the Automobile Crisis’, 
The New Yorker, 24 November 2008, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/georgepacker/2008/11/edmund-
wilson-o.html  
6 See only Cardozo’s opinion in the 1928 case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. [162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)]. For a 
discussion of these issues, see J. Oberdiek, 'Philosophical Issues in Tort Law', (2008) 3 Philosophy Compass 734-
748; C. F. Cranor, 'A Philosophy of Risk Assessment and the Law: A Case Study of the Role of Philosophy in 
Public Policy', (1997) 85 Philosophical Studies 135-162; see also Dayna N. Scott, “Law, Risk and Administration”, 
Continuum Magazine, Special Issue “Osgoode.KNOWLEDGE”, 2009. 
7 See, e.g., R. A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
8 See, e.g., J. Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing, 2004); with regard to the risks identified in the 
current crisis, see only N. N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Random House, 2007); 
S. Schwarcz, 'Systemic Risk', (2008) 97 Georgetown L. J. 193 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008326); O. H. Dombalagian, ''Too interconnected to fail?': 
Investment Banks and Systemic Risks', (2008) Tulane Law School Working Paper http://ssrn.com/abstract=1249441 
9 R. J. Shiller, The New Financial Order. Risk in the 21st Century (Princeton University Press, 2003) 
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to implosion10, only formed part of a seemingly insatiable expansion of borrowing and lending 
activities concerning commercial real estate, commodities and international equities.11 As the 
first ‘lessons’ are being drawn and the first sets of calls for speedy but comprehensive, swift but 
thorough reform made, it is fast becoming clear that the risk of the financial surge of the last 15 
years has and will be borne by investors who in an absolutely disillusioning manner had 
everything ‘on the line’. Yet, a closer look at the investors who are said to have lost their homes 
and their income soon reveals that in fact many of these investors had already been in a 
miserable position well before the bubble burst. The close linkage between so-called defined 
contribution (401-K) plans in the U.S. and the particular corporate finance/governance regime 
that exclusively focused on a company’s short-term performance on the stock market, made of 
most employees de facto investors. As retirement savings were put into corporate stock, which 
became reinvested and commodified, these ‘savings’ became crucially exposed to the volatility 
of the market. The insecurity of employees’ old age investments was only exacerbated through 
the increasingly aggressive role played by institutional investors, above all, by pension funds that 
are often plagued by short-term orientation and their fund managers’ brief tenure.12 The current 
‘crisis’, in fact, continues but does not constitute a long-term decline of retirement security.13 
This has important repercussions for any identification and assessment of the risk(s) connected 
with the current financial situation. 
 
Close up, the picture of the current crisis is in fact one of many layers and shades. This provides 
a formidably humbling context for any search for responses, remedies, solutions. 
Complementing the current inquiry into systemic risk and its management, just touched upon, 
institutionally, then, the talk today is concerned with the need for a ‘strong’ hand, and the 
inevitability of ‘intervention’, of ‘more’ and of ‘better’ control and oversight. It is this widely 
shared sense of emergency out of which grow the suggestions for general toughness and 
diligence. This paper takes issue with this enthusiasm for institutional responses, the creation of 
tougher rules, new monitoring agencies and more severe accountability. It does so for the simple 
reason that things are not that simple.14 Striking evidence for the complexity of the situation and, 
correspondingly, of the regulatory concepts and instruments that we are in need of developing is 
provided by the history of the regulatory state itself. This paper will briefly touch on the 
                                                
10 G. Soros, The New Financial Paradigm. The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means (Public Affairs, 2008), XV 
11 D. W. Arner, 'The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences', (2009) University of Hongkong, Asian 
Institute of International Financial Law, AIIFL Working Paper No. 3 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330744, 1 
12 S. Jacoby, 'Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality and Democracy', (2008) SSRN Working Paper, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020843 (in P. Zumbansen & C.Williams eds., The Embedded Firm: Labour, 
Corporate Governance, and Finance Capitalism, 2009) forthcoming, 7 
13 C. E. Weller, 'Lessons from the Financial Crisis for Retirement Security: Building Better Retirement Plans. 
Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor “The Impact of the 
Financial Crisis on Workers’ Retirement Security”, 7 October 2008', (2008) 
http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/2008-10-07-ChristianWeller.pdf , 1, 2 (listing, in particular, ‘limited retirement 
plan coverage, little retirement wealth, and increasing risk exposure of the individual’) 
14 See the intriguing plea for straight-forward, no-nonsense laws by R. A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex 





development of regulatory law during and after the height of the regulatory state in Western 
Europe, if only to illustrate the deeply complex landscape of direct and indirect regulation, by 
government agencies, courts, private parties and numerous organizations that fit nicely neither in 
the public nor the private arena. While this is well known generally15, it is certainly true in the 
area of financial regulation, capital market law and corporate governance16, with which this 
paper is primarily concerned. 
 
The following observations focus on the intricate correlation between the conceptual notion of 
risk management and on the institutional dimension of ‘market regulation’ or ‘state intervention’ 
in the area of capital market law and corporate governance. In a strict sense, geographically, the 
paper will use examples from the European Union, but the concerned regulatory regimes can 
more adequately be understood as ‘global assemblages’17, or, as I will argue, as examples of 
transnational legal pluralism.18 As such, they are – on the one hand – neither exclusively 
national (domestic) nor international, while – on the other – not eliminating or overcoming the 
nation state.19 Rather, these assemblages, in their description through the Chicago sociologist, 
Saskia Sassen, are constituted through persistent local activity and interpretation and are as such 
comprised of human, institutional as well as technological elements, the latter resulting 
predominantly from the breathtaking advances in information technology (‘digitalizations’).20In 
contrasting the concept of transnational legal pluralism with that of Sassen’s global assemblages, 
I will suggest that despite the convincing account of the changed and yet crucial relation between 
the national and the global that Sassen presents, there is a continuing need for a specifically legal 
perspective on the reconfiguration of ‘spaces and places’ that is so powerfully shaping human 
activity and policies. It is here where it is important to draw on earlier writing in legal sociology 
and legal pluralism. 
                                                
15 See only C. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution. Reconceiving of the Regulatory State (Harvard University 
Press, 1990); M. Stolleis, A History of Public Law in Germany 1914-1945 (Thomas Dunlop transl.) (Oxford 
University Press, 2004); A. C. Aman Jr., 'Administrative Law for a New Century', in M. Taggart (eds.), The 
Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, 1997). 
16 For a highly instructive account and analysis, see C. Bumke, 'Regulierung am Beispiel der Kapitalmärkte', in K. J. 
Hopt,R. Veil and J. A. Kämmerer (eds.), Kapitalmarktgesetzgebung im Europäischen Binnenmarkt (Mohr Siebeck, 
2008); C. Bumke, 'Kapitalmarktregulierung. Eine Untersuchung über Konzeption und Dogmatik des 
Regulierungsverwaltungsrechts', (2008) 41 Die Verwaltung [DV] 227-257 
17 For this concept, see S. Sassen, Territory - Authority - Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton 
University Press, 2006); a preparation of the argument of the national-global intertwinedness is given in S. Sassen, 
The Global City (Princeton University Press, 1991), and S. Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the 
New Mobility of People and Money (The New Press, 1998); for a discussion and application, see now M. 
Amstutz/V. Karavas, 'Weltrecht: Ein Derridasches Monster', in G.-P. Calliess,A. Fischer-Lescano,D. Wielsch and P. 
Zumbansen (eds.), Soziologische Jurisprudenz. Liber Amicorum für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag (Walter 
de Gruyter, 2009) 
18 For a presentation, see P. Zumbansen, ''New Governance' in European Corporate Governance Regulation as 
Transnational Legal Pluralism', (2008) 15 European L.J. 246-276 [available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145] 
19 Sassen, Territory – Authority – Rights, op. cit., 325. 
20 Sassen, Territory – Authority – Rights, op. cit., 349 (noting the importance of focusing on financial centres, not 
‘markets’, “as key nested communities enabling the construction and functioning of such cultures of interpretation.” 
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The paper will proceed in three steps. First, I will contrast the pursued regulatory strategies in the 
two areas of capital market law and corporate governance in the EU. The central assumption of 
this complementary presentation of these two areas, that have seen a surge in regulatory activity 
– in Europe and beyond – is that in particular the transformation of corporate finance during the 
last two decades has led to a far-reaching approximation of both areas. This is a remarkable 
development, as it raises intriguing questions regarding, for one, the methodology that informs 
the conceptual construction and demarcation of legal doctrinal fields. In other words, how and 
why do we (continue to) distinguish between capital market law and corporate governance 
(law)? Secondly, the apparent overlapping and intertwining of these two distinct regulatory areas 
presents formidable challenges for our understanding of the law and the specific regulatory 
instruments relied upon governing each or both of the concerned areas.  
 
In the second section I will reflect on the driving forces behind the continuing regulatory reform 
process in both areas and discuss recurring concepts such as harmonization (‘maximum’, 
‘minimum’, ‘reflexive’) and regulatory competition against the analysis of market embeddedness 
provided by Karl Polanyi in the 1940s and the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ studies by scholars such 
as Hollingsworth21 and Hall/Soskice22 in recent years. The third and last section seeks to provide 
an explanation for the particular forms of legal regulatory regimes that are emerging in the 
named areas. Contrasting or complementing Sassen’s account of ‘global assemblages’, I will 
argue for a legal pluralist reading of the emerging regulatory regimes. 
 
 
II. CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
WHO ARE KAIN AND ABEL IN THE QUEST FOR AN EFFICIENT 
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKET? 
 
A. IN SEARCH OF A HARMONIZED EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKET  
 
In the context of this paper, we can confine ourselves to a brief overview and assessment of the 
developments made with respect to the regulation of capital market law. During the last years, 
extensive and comprehensive studies have become available that pay adequate due to the 
important growth of this area of regulatory activity and scholarly inquiry. Common to these 
                                                
21 J. R. Hollingsworth, 'The Institutional Embeddedness of American Capitalism', in C. Crouch and W. Streeck 
(eds.), Political Economy of Moden Capitalism. Mapping Convergence and Diversity (Sage, 1997); J. R. 
Hollingsworth, 'New perspectives on the spatial dimensions of economic coordination: tensions between 
globalization and social systems of production', (1998) 5 Review of International Political Economy 482-507   
22 P. A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 





assessments is the assumption that long-term, economic growth in Europe is being closely linked 
to an effectively and supportively regulated securities market.23 Namely, the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice [ECJ] have been playing decisive roles in the 
context of shaping a continuously evolving, regulatory framework in this area. Central to the 
Commission’s regulatory efforts was the 1999 release of the Financial Services Action Plan 
[“FASP”], which in its wake spurred a tremendously dynamic series of legislative initiatives. 
The FASP came into being at a time, when there was very little movement and even less advance 
in the area of corporate law harmonization – some even spoke of an ‘almost empty’ agenda24 
Programmatic and regulatory initiatives in the context of the FASP have included the 
inauguration of the Lamfalussy Commission, which in 2001, after a the release of a preliminary 
report and the initiation of a consultation process, produced its comprehensive final report where 
it addressed and discussed the challenges and needs to work towards an efficient and dynamic 
securities market in Europe.25 Echoing the views shared by a wide spectrum of scholars and 
practitioners in the area, the Report, from the outset, identified the immediate necessity to bring 
swift reform to the existing regulatory framework in European financial regulation. This reform 
had become necessary mainly in light of the breathtaking advances made in financial activity 
around the world over the past 15-20 years, the consequences of which for securities regulation 
on the one hand and corporate (organization and finance) law on the other were becoming more 
and more obvious.26 
 
Despite the fact that the FASP regulatory initiatives partake of a very recent history, the wide-
ranging assessments of their structure, aspirations, their successes and shortcomings are fast 
beginning to fill symposia, edited collections and bibliographies, not to mention the slew of 
working papers appearing, in short succession, in the Social Science Research Network 
(www.ssrn.com). Central to the debates surrounding the state of the European Financial Market 
after the introduction of a number of Directives is the concern over the inconsistency of the 
Directives’ implementation by the individual Member States. The verdict, for the time being at 
least, is that due to the many political differences on the one hand and existing variations of 
securities regulation institutions across Europe a harmonized securities market is still far away.27 
Looked at closely, the Prospectus28, Market Abuse29, Takeover Bids30 and Transparency31 
                                                
23 See, e.g., K. J. Hopt/E. Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2003); 
M. G. Warren, European Securities Regulation (Kluwer Law International, 2003); E. Ferran, Building an EU 
Securities Market (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
24 L. Enriques/M. Gatti, 'EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Law: Do They Tackle Insiders' 
Opportunism?' (2007) 28 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1-33, 4 
25 For a chronology and related documents, go to 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm  
26 See, e.g., T. M. J. Möllers, 'Europäische Methoden- und Gesetzgebungslehre im Kapitalmarktrecht. 
Vollharmonisierung, Generalklauseln und soft law im Rahmen des Lamfalussy-Verfahrens zur Etablierung von 
Standards', (2008) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 480-505, 482 
27 See only L. Enriques/M. Gatti, 'Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law After the Financial Services Action Plan?' 
(2007) Proceedings of the 7th Nordic Company Law Conference http://ssrn.com/abstract=982282 
28 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/prospectus/index_en.htm  
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Directives allow for a range of varying implementation regimes that are altogether committed to 
the idea of ‘optionality’32 but, as a consequence, fall short of bringing about an effectively 
levelled playing field for actors in the European Market. At the same time, the Lamfalussy 
Commission consolidated and formalized the operation of a monitoring mechanism with a stick, 
embodied by the European Securities Committee – ESC on the one hand and the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators – CESR on the other. These play an important role in the 
evolving multi-polar process of European securities regulation. After the political orientation is 
identified through the Council and the Parliament, the Commission and the Parliament – in 
collaboration with ESC and CESR – design the more concrete implementation and execution 
procedures. It is after this process that in a third step the CESR through the different regulatory 
agencies it brings together produce recommendations, benchmarks standards. Despite these 
being without legally binding power, they are meant to nevertheless provide a compellingly 
coherent reference mark for the implementation of the introduced measures.33 On a fourth and 
last step it is the Commission that is in charge to assess the successful implementation of the 
regulations. 
 
As we will discuss in more detail later in this paper (III., IV.), the particular dynamics of this 
regulatory area raise significant questions concerning the way in which legislative goals are 
being identified, which interests are being considered and how these feed into the constitution 
and re-constitution of distinct doctrinal and conceptual fields. As in other areas, markedly 
European Contract law and, more specifically, European consumer protection law34, the pursuit 
of a European regulatory framework in capital markets law and corporate governance occurs 
against highly charged assessments of the underlying assumptions and goals that inform the 
regulatory process. Market efficiency represents, in this context, a highly persuasive formula 
that, when studied more closely, does not by itself contain much clarification as to the interests 
and goals that are actually being pursued. This dilemma, that certainly seems to plague any 
reform agenda in complex regulatory areas, is further exacerbated by the fact that the European 
                                                                                                                                                       
29 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/abuse/index_en.htm  
30 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/takeoverbids/index_en.htm  
31 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transparency/index_en.htm  
32 Skeptically: L. Enriques/M. Gatti, 'Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law After the Financial Services Action 
Plan?' (2007) Proceedings of the 7th Nordic Company Law Conference http://ssrn.com/abstract=982282; for a 
helpful conceptual discussion, see G. Hertig/J. A. McCahery, 'Optional rather than Mandatory EU Company Law: 
Framework and Specific Proposals', (2007) European Company and Financial Law Review [ECFR] 341-362. 
33 T. M. J. Möllers, 'Europäische Methoden- und Gesetzgebungslehre im Kapitalmarktrecht, op.cit., at 484 
34 See U. Mattei/F. Nicola, 'A 'Social Dimension' in European Private Law? The Call for Setting a Progressive 
Agenda', (2006) 41 New Engl. L. Rev. 1-66; T. Wilhelmsson, 'Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law', 
(2004) 10 European Law Journal 712-733; G. Howells/T. Wilhelmsson, 'EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of Age?' 
(2003) 28 European Law Review 370-388; G.-P. Calliess, 'The Limits of Eclecticism in Consumer Law: National 
Struggles and the Hope for a coherent European Contract Law: A Comment on the  ECJ's and the FCJ's "Heininger" 





securities market (or, the European Company Law Scene35) constitutes an even more complex 
arena and context than a historically evolved regulatory area in a particular state.36 As will be 
argued more fully below (III), substantive law reforms in Europe regularly occur with the open-
ended European integration project in their background. 
 
Before we briefly highlight the particular dimensions of European Corporate Governance 
Regulation [ECGR], we shall pause for a moment to reflect on the connections between capital 
market law and corporate governance. The different speeds at which each area has been 
developing in Europe could suggest that it would indeed be possible to neatly distinguish 
between them as clearly distinct, conceptually and doctrinally contained regulatory areas. There 
are several elements at play that point into the opposite direction, which we briefly want to 
allude to under the heading of the ‘financialization of the corporation’. 
 
B. THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE CORPORATION 
 
Since 1980, the financialization of the corporation has led to a widely held acceptance of 
subjecting every element of a business firm to varied processes of securitization37, involving a 
fast proliferating landscape of investment actors.38 This strategy, pursued by companies across 
the world, is pursued to attract a highly diversified investment of global investment pools. Far-
reaching deregulation with regard to capital control during the 1980s has facilitated an 
unprecedented flow of capital across national boundaries, allowing for securitizations, often 
repeatedly, of a large number of assets, including pension claims, real estate and commercial 
claims. With companies designing corporate strategy primarily with stock performance in mind, 
shareholder value became the dominating principle in assessing corporate performance, fuelled 
by a seemingly unstoppable growth in index values.  
 
The focus on short-time volatility of corporate shares to evaluate a company’s merits and 
prospects would quickly become the only perspective from which we would try to understand a 
                                                
35 C. Schmitthoff, 'The Future of the European Company Law Scene', in C. Schmitthoff (eds.), The Harmonisation 
of European Company Law (The U.K. Nat'l. Committee of Comparative Law, 1973) 
36 For an illustration of the latter, see R. Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (The American 
Enterprise  Institute Press, 1993); for the former: R. Buxbaum/K. J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business 
Enterprise. Corporate and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A. (Walter de Gruyter, 
1988) 
37 R. Dore, 'Financialization of the Global Economy', (2008) 17 Industrial and Corporate Change 1097-1112, 1099: 
“The basic financial innovation on which the pyramid of ever more arcane financial instruments is built is 
securitization.” 
38 F. Partnoy/R. Thomas, 'Gap Filling, Hedge Funds and Financial Innovation', in Y. Fuchita and R. E. Litan (eds.), 
New Financial Instruments and Institutions. Opportunities and Policy Challenges (Brookings, 2007) 
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firm.39 But this narrowing of gaze came at the price of also blinding out that the firm’s 
environment had dramatically been transformed over the course of a few decades. To the degree 
that the advancement of communication and information technology revolutionized the transfer 
of derivatives, sometimes as a company’s virtual assets, across vast strategic spaces, the attention 
given to stock performance eventually removed the firm from its geographical environment by 
elevating it into a purely ethereal realm. In consequence of its financialization, the share or other 
security of the corporation (its ‘reference asset’ for the creation of another synthetic security) 
became radically virtualised. What architects of synthetic credit instruments call the reference 
asset, which can be the original subject of a loan or security, became radically virtualised in 
relation to the business corporation. The corporation, in turn, was reduced to an anchoring point 
for independently originated financial programs, thereby positioning the corporation no longer in 
a real economy, but in an artificial space of financial engineering. 
 
In the end the firm as we have come to understand it over the past 20 years, had even outgrown 
even the ideal model of a nexus of contracts.40 In order to remain operational, the model had to 
be adapted to the processes of financial engineering, which – at least partially – moved the 
corporation out of the centre of the labyrinth of contracts in which it, or its securities, are 
entangled. The financialization of the corporation and its securities entailed a radical separation 
of the corporation itself from the instruments that represent claims in, of, or against the 
corporation. The corporation had become a nodal point for an ephemeral crossing, interlinking 
and overlapping of financial vectors, channelled through the glass structure of the legal person, 
with almost to no relation to the original ‘business’ of the corporation. A dream fulfilled, with 
money flowing in and out of the firm, the corporation had become a virtual realm for strategic 
investment. 
 
The financialization of corporate governance is powerfully reflected in the fast rise in importance 
of financial experts in the board of directors, the importance of financial expertise in the making 
of business decisions and, finally, in the transformation of the educational environment for the 
supporting professions – including lawyers, consultancies and accountants. The flip-side of this 
is the dramatic erosion of labour interests representation in the contemporary business 
corporation. Where corporate activity had for a long time been marked by a lively public 
political discussion of different constituencies’ interests in the firm, its financial and physical 
virtualization41 increasingly erased the reference points for a general assessment of what 
corporations were doing. 
 
                                                
39 W. Lazonick/M. O'Sullivan, 'Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance', in W. 
Lazonick and M. O'Sullivan (eds.), Corporate Governance and Sustainable Prosperity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
40 For a reminiscence, see A. A. Alchian/H. Demsetz, 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', 
(1972) 62 American Economic Review 777-795; M. C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm. Governance, Residual Claims, 
and Organizational Forms (Harvard University Press, 2000). 
41 See, e.g., W. H. Davidow/M. S. Malone, The Virtual Corporation. Structuring and Revitalizing the Corporation 
for the 21st Century (Harper Collins, 1992); for the foundations, see M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 





As suggested above, the financialization of the corporation led to significant changes in the 
corporate regulatory framework. The ‘financialization’ of the business corporation, which 
arguably had always been part of the corporate identity42, does, however, exhaust itself neither in 
the adaptation of corporate finance to globally available, highly diversified investment tools and 
opportunities nor in the wide-ranging turn of regulatory policy towards shareholder value that 
gave rise to the ‘corporate governance movement’ of the last decade in corporate law theory and 
practice.43 Moreover, the financialization paradigm eventually led to a dramatic reconfiguration 
of the ‘embedded corporation’44 by upsetting and shifting the institutional framework of the 
corporation’s regulatory environment45 with tremendous consequences on both the domestic and 
the transnational level. As national governments found themselves drawn into highly charged 
political debates over the goals of corporate law reform, that themselves were increasingly 
likened to existential questions of national survival46, the European lawmaker, too, came under 
growing pressure to follow up on long-standing promises and aspirations to work towards a more 
effective level playing field for European companies.47 
 
C. THE UPS AND DOWNS, RIGHTS AND LEFTS OF EUROPEAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The varied history of European corporate law regulation is marked by the diversity of interests 
and concerns invested in this area of regulation. While the legislative record was, until recently, 
not altogether comprehensive48, ECGR has in the last years become one of the most vibrant 
                                                
42 L. E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy. How Finance Triumphed over Industry (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
2007) 
43 S. Deakin, 'The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value', (2005) 13 Corporate Governance 11-18 
44 S. M. Jacoby, The Embedded Corporation. Corporate Governance and Employment Relations in Japan and the 
United States (Princeton University Press, 2004) 
45 See only J. Hoffmann, 'Co-ordinated Continental European Market Economies Under Pressure From 
Globalisation: Germany's "Rhineland capitalism"', (2004) 5 German Law Journal 985-1002; J. W. Cioffi, 'Corporate 
Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and 
Germany', (2006) 7 German L. J. 533-562 
46 T. Baums, 'Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law Making Process of a very new 
nature', (2001) 2 German Law Journal at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43 
47 C. Schmitthoff, 'The Future of the European Company Law Scene', in C. Schmitthoff (eds.), The Harmonisation 
of European Company Law (The U.K. Nat'l. Committee of Comparative Law, 1973); G. Hertig, 'Western Europe's 
Corporate Governance Dilemma', in T. Baums,K. J. Hopt and N. Horn (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and 
Business in the Law. Liber Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (Kluwer Law International, 2000); J. Winter, 'Report of 
the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe', 
(2002) at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf 
48 For an overview of the legislative acts in the area of company law up to 2000, see J. Wouters, 'European Company 
Law: Quo Vadis?' (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 257-307, and V. Edwards, EC Company Law (Oxford 
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sectors of norm-creation and regulatory interaction. As such, ECGR has become a regulatory 
universe of its own, with a large portfolio within the Commission’s Internal Market division and 
a seemingly tireless expert community feeding into the policy and norm making process at every 
turn. With ECGR long having left the confines of the European Court of Justice, the Council and 
Parliament, it has expanded into an extremely versatile, comparative and transnational legal 
field. ECGR constitutes a semi-autonomous field, comprised both of hard law and social norms, 
which are in a constant relation of complementarity, fusion and irritation.49 As such ECGR 
presents formidable challenges for legal, economic, sociological or political analysis. From the 
point of view of legal pluralism, the particularity and intricacy of ECGR lies in its mixed 
constitution of law and ‘social norms’.50 Seen through the legal pluralist lens, ECGR develops as 
a co-evolutionary process, where the imposition of law – which encompasses regulations, 
directives, recommendations and judgments – is both shaping and being shaped by the norms 
evolving outside of its imposition. Similar to the unpredictability of consequences and effects of 
rights/principles-transplants51, ECGR faces enormous challenges in terms of legal certainty and 
strategy, given its many sources of potential disturbance, irritation, and complementing points 
due to its complex regulatory agenda. With view to the challenges facing the EU from the 
substantive enlargement in 2004, Silvana Sciarra observed: ‘As the tradition of comparative legal 
scholarship in Europe has taught us, the attempt to pursue a “transplant” of legal institutions 
uncritically is both a sign of disregard for traditions different from the one to be transplanted, 
and, very often, is an inefficient solution.’52 
                                                                                                                                                       
University Press, 1999); for a more recent discussion of state and prospects of EC company law making, see K. J. 
Hopt, 'European Company Law and Corporate Governance: Where does the Action Plan of the European 
Commission Lead?' in K. J. Hopt,E. Wymeersch,H. Kanda and H. Baum (eds.), Corporate Governance in Context 
(Oxford University Press, 2005); for a continuously updated listing of directives, regulations and recommendations, 
see the website of the European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm (last 
visited 5 April 2008) 
49 S. F. Moore, 'Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study', (1973) 7 
Law & Society Review 719-746; G. Teubner, 'Eigensinnige Produktionsregimes: Zur Ko-evolution von Wirtschaft 
und Recht in den varieties of capitalism', (1999) 5 Soziale Systeme 7-25 
50 P. Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European 
Company Law', (2006) 12 Eur. L. J. 534-556; see generally S. E. Merry, 'Legal Pluralism', (1988) 22 Law & Society 
Review 869-901; H. W. Arthurs/C. Mummé, 'From Governance To Political Economy: Workers As Citizens, 
Stakeholders and Productive Social Actors. Paper for the First International CLPE Conference: The Corporate 
Governance Matrix: Unfolding the New Agenda, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 20-21 October 2005', (2005) 
CLPE Research Paper Series (www.comparativeresearch.net) , published in (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
439-470 
51 G. Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends Up In New Divergences', in P. A. Hall and D. Soskice 
(eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 
2001); K. Pistor, 'Of Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development', in P. Cornelius and B. Kogut 
(eds.), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
52 S. Sciarra, 'The Convergence of European Labour and Social Rights: Opening to the Open Method of 
Coordination', in G. A. Bermann and K. Pistor (eds.), Law and Governance in an Enlarged European Union (Hart 





Adding to the difficulties arising from the multilevel and multi-stakeholder dimension in 
company law regulation in Europe, ECGR has been amplifying the tensions that underlie the 
conceptual and architectural distinction between ‘company’ and ‘capital market’ law, which are 
deeply embedded in a country’s market Regulation histories.53 Struggling with competing policy 
goals regarding the enhancement of market freedoms as they relate to capital market rules on the 
one hand and to corporate governance law on the other, ECGR is driven to actualize ‘the best of 
both worlds’. Yet, while corporate law itself appears to continue to withstand all attempts at 
deconstruction and demystification by other conceptual frameworks as to what corporations do54, 
ECGR finds itself deeply involved in a large, ever-so amorphous market-building project. The 
‘function’ of the firm, as necessarily implicated within ECGR, must now extend far beyond the 
financial-organisational dimensions that have recently again been depicted as the ‘what’, ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ of corporate law. Within the European project, in particular after the Lisbon Summit 
200055 and its most recent reinvigoration in form of a ‘social makeover’56, corporate law has 
become a strategic token in a complex multilevel governance game that brings a much wider 
range of players to the policy-making table than any single Market regulation unit would 
reasonably want to assume responsibility for. 
 
While the to-do-list for ECGR, only seems to keep growing in view of pressing competitive, 
social, environmental and monitoring demands57, it has in fact always been evolving in a 
                                                
53 R. Wiethölter, Interessen und Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft im amerikanischen und deutschen Recht (C. F. 
Müller, 1961); R. Buxbaum/K. J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the Business Enterprise. Corporate and Capital 
Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A. (Walter de Gruyter, 1988); F. Kübler, 'The Impact of 
Equity Markets on Business Organization: Some Comparative Observations Regarding Differences in the Evolution 
of Corporate Structures', (2001) 2 European Business Organization Law Review [EBOR] 669-683; H. Merkt, 'Zum 
Verhältnis von Kapitalmarktrecht und Gesellschaftsrecht in der Diskussion um die Corporate Governance', (2003) 
48 AG 126-136; H. Eidenmüller, 'Forschungsperspektiven im Unternehmensrecht', (2007) 62 Juristenzeitung [JZ] 
487-494; N. Moloney, 'New Frontiers in EC Capital Markets Law: From Market Construction to Market 
Regulation', (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 809-843; for the U.S., see only R. Romano, 'The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance', (2005) 114 Yale L. J. 1521-1611 
54 See only Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (Little Brown, 1986), at 5 (regarding the importance of incorporating 
labour law into one’s study of business corporations); but see R. Kraakman/P. L. Davies/H. Hansmann/G. Hertig/K. 
J. Hopt/H. Kanda/E. B. Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 
55 ‘THE LISBON SPECIAL EUROPEAN COUNCIL (MARCH 2000): TOWARDS A EUROPE OF INNOVATION AND 
KNOWLEDGE’ (HTTP://EUROPA.EU/SCADPLUS/LEG/EN/CHA/C10241.HTM) (LAST VISITED 5 APRIL 2008) 
56 Euractiv: Lisbon Agenda gets social makeover (18 March 2008), reporting on the 13-14 March 2008 Summit’s 
recommendations to move away from its purely “growth and jobs” focus of the past three years and to put the 
environment and citizens more “in the foreground” (http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/eu-lisbon-agenda-gets-
social-makeover/article-171013) (last visited 5 April 2008) 
57 See the Commission’s Action Plan of 2003 “MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND ENHANCING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – A PLAN TO MOVE FORWARD” [COM (2003) 284 Final]; see also the 
Director General’s for Internal Market and Services’ Summary Report of 2007 on the “Consultation and Hearing on 
Future Priorities on the Action Plan […]”; on the tasks lying ahead, see K. J. Hopt, 'European Company Law and 
Corporate Governance: Where does the Action Plan of the European Commission Lead?' in K. J. Hopt,E. 
Wymeersch,H. Kanda and H. Baum (eds.), Corporate Governance in Context (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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particularly accentuated and contested field of contrasting and competing Member State agendas 
in pursuit of national prosperity, of which corporate and capital market law had always been a 
central building block.58 As such, ECGR has never sat comfortably within the wider market 
integration agenda. The real challenges of company law harmonization, however, became 
impressively obvious during the exhausting struggle over the adoption of a regulation concerning 
the creation of the European Company statute, originally initiated already in the 1970s, and 
eventually passed after many more compromises, in 2001.59 Another illustration of how ECGR 
has been inextricably caught up in the European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’60 was, without doubt, 
the long contest over a European Takeover Directive61, which resulted in 2004 in a Directive full 
of loop-holes and opt-out clauses.62 Eddy Wymeersch recently called the moment of adopting the 
Directive a ‘provisional semi-final point in a process that has taken more than 17 years, and 
according to some even more than 30 years on the way to opening up the European markets for 
corporate control.’63 At the time, André Nilsen observed that ‘[T]he Takeover Directive sees 
light after a long and acrimonious journey through the institutional labyrinth in Brussels.’64 
 
As the regulatory trajectory of ECGR continues to unfold, we must be even more sensitive to the 
degree to which this enterprise remains deeply embedded in the particular dynamics of 
multilevel governance of European integration on the one hand65 and the globalization of 
                                                
58 J. W. Cioffi/S. S. Cohen, 'The state, law and corporate governance: the advantage of forwardness', in S. S. Cohen 
and G. Boyd (eds.), Corporate Governance and Globalization. Long Range Planning Issues (Edward Elgar, 2000) 
59 E. Werlauff, 'The SE Company - A New Common European Company from 8 October 2004', (2003) 14 European 
Business Law Review [EBLR] 85-103; C. Teichmann, 'The European Company - A Challenge to Academics, 
Legislatures and Practitioners', (2003) 4 German L. J. 309-330 
60 P. A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 
61 See R. J. Gilson, 'The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate 
Governance Environment', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), European Takeovers. Law and Practice 
(Butterworths, 1992), and E. Wymeersch, 'Problems of the Regulation of Takeover Bids in Western Europe: A 
Comparative Survey', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), European Takeovers. Law and Practice 
(Butterworths, 1992). 
62 For the history, see C. Kirchner/R. W. Painter, 'Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth 
EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform', (2002) 50 
American Journal of Comparative Law 451-476; P. Zumbansen, 'European Corporate Law and National 
Divergences: The Case of Takeover Law', (2004) 3 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 867-886; for a recent analysis, see 
Blanaid Clarke, ‘Takeover Regulation: Through the Looking Glass’, (2007) CLPE Comparative Research in Law & 
Political Economy Research Paper No. 18, available at: www.comparativeresearch.net/papers.jsp; for a US-UK 
comparative perspective, see John Armour & David Skeel Jr., ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and 
Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation’, (2007) Georgetown L. J. 1727-1794. 
63 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Takeover Bid Directive, Light and Darkness’, (January 2008) Financial Law Institute 
Working Paper No. 2008-01, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086987, at 2 
64 A. Nilsen, 'The EU Takeover Directive and the Competitiveness of European Industry', (2004) The Oxford 
Council on Good Governance http://www.oxfordgovernance.org/fileadmin/Publications/EY001.pdf 
65 See M. Jachtenfuchs, 'The Governance Approach to European Integration', (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market 





markets and regulatory processes on the other.66 Under such conditions, an assessment of the 
concrete forms of norm-creation presents great challenges due to ECGR’s complex appearances 
ranging from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ law to norms that are developed, promulgated and disseminated by 
a panoply of public and private actors.67 Therefore, instead of trying to free ECGR from its 
embeddedness in this complex regulatory environment, the emphasis must be on the exact 
opposite. Precisely by embracing the embeddedness of ECGR as a transnational legal field can 
we begin to better see the concrete as well as the amorphous forms of change. Embeddedness is 
here understood in the following four dimensions: 
 
a) ECGR is informed by the policy and legislative dynamics between corporate law and 
capital-market law (securities regulation) as well as between corporate law and labour 
law, categorizations of functionally separable legal areas that can be found in all 
advanced industrialized societies and that are increasingly challenged through global 
forces of rule-making; 
b) ECGR is entangled in the European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ with regard to corporate 
and labour regulation, as evidenced for example in the struggle over the Takeover 
Directive and the statute of the Societas Europaea; 
c) ECGR as part of the larger project towards the completion of the European internal 
market68, in particular in the post-Lisbon environment of knowledge society politics 
within the EU69 
d) ECGR as semi-autonomous field, marked by a vibrant and yet precarious, always 
threatened balance between official law making, transnational consultations, expert 
committee preparatory work, recommendations, communications and standardization, 
that we see unfolding on the domestic, EU-supranational and transnational level. 
                                                                                                                                                       
C. F. Sabel/J. Zeitlin, 'Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU', 
(2008) 14 European L.J. 271-327. 
66 See e.g. D. Rodrik, 'Governance of Economic Globalization', in J. S. Nye and J. D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in 
a Globalizing World (Brookings, 2000); David S. Law, ‘Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights’, 
(2008) Nw. U. L. Rev. 1-82, at 31: ‘Although globalization appears to have levelled off in the world’s wealthiest 
countries in recent years – and the “social” component, in particular, now lags behind the “economic” and the 
“political” components – the overall trend across all countries remains one of increasing globalization.’ 
67 For a succinct account of this regulatory development, see D. Trubek/L. G. Trubek, 'Hard and Soft Law in the 
Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Coordination', (2005) 11 European Law Journal 
343-364. 
68 C. Barnard/S. Deakin, 'Market Access and Regulatory Competition', in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), The Law of 
the Single European Market. Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing, 2002) 
69 See the Presidency Conclusions of the Council of the European Union [7652/08], March 13-14, 2008, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/99410.pdf, at 4: ‘The implementation of 
the broad-based innovation strategy is key to realising EU ambitions in the area.’ For an intriguing historical 
background, see Dominique Pestre, Science, Society and Politics. Knowledge Societies from an Historical 
Perspective. Report to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, European Commission, January 2007, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/historical-perspectives_en.pdf. 
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To better illustrate where the current debate on European corporate governance including 
comparative corporate governance stands from and to perhaps gain a better view on where it 
might be going, some comparative history is necessary. Within the US. Scholarly discourse – 
which powerfully feeds into and informs a global discussion about corporate governance 
standards, their convergence or divergence, among the defining landmarks are: the Berle-Dodd 
debate of the 1930s about the responsibilities of management, the Berle-Means treatise on 
“Modern Corporation and Private Property” – this treatise, which famously observed that in 
liquified capital markets and with a professional management, shareholders face a monitoring 
problem due to the ‘separation of ownership and control’, has become again, some 75 years later, 
focus of renewed attention (Bratton, Wachter, Tsuk Mitchell) – this leads to a renewed inquiry 
into the conditions of US embedded capitalism then and now. It therefore enriches the political 
analysis provided for by scholars such as Mark Roe and potentially links it to ongoing work 
among economic sociologists such as Granovetter70 and Beckert71 on the one hand and recent 
developments within new institutional economics on the other. Further, the rise of Law & 
Economics in Anglo-American and Anglo-Saxon corporate law, which has come to be the most 
persuasive and most influential unified approach to describe the nature of corporations.72 It is 
against this background, mixed with some comparative law, that the above named scholars have 
posited that there will be more convergence than divergence and that shareholder primacy will 
become the definitive theory of corporate governance regulation.73 Closely related is the so-
called Legal Origins Thesis, put forward by renowned economists La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny during the last one and a half decades: their claim is, abbreviated, that 
countries with common law tradition have higher levels of effective investor protection, liquid 
capital markets and growing prosperity whereas countries of the civil law tradition do not. 
Common law jurisdictions are found to be featuring a high level of outside control on 
corporations, whereas civil law countries are known as so-called insider-systems of corporate 
governance. This thesis has been attacked from various sides (Spamann, Siems, 
Deakin/Ahlering, Roe, Jackson, Licht). More recently, even, the recognition of the short-
comings of the ‘economic man’ has been informing the fast rise to fame of the field of 
behavioural economics (Jolls, Sunstein, Thaler), which has been contributing to an ever more 
engaged debate about corporate actors’ behaviour and the need for regulators to take a more 
                                                
70 M. Granovetter, 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', (1985) 91 American 
Journal of Sociology 481-510 
71 J. Beckert, 'The Great Transformation of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology', (2007) 
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung/Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies, MPIfG Discussion 
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72 For an interesting analysis, see B. R. Cheffins, 'The Trajectory of (Corporate) Law Scholarship', (2004) 63 Cambr. 
L. J. 456-506 
73 H. Hansmann, 'How Close is the End of History?' (2006) 31 J. Corp. L. 745-750; but see W. W. Bratton/J. A. 
McCahery, 'Comparative Corporate Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference', in J. A. McCahery,P. 
Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity 
(Oxford University Press, 2002); S. Deakin, 'Reflexive Governance and European Company Law, in: CLPE 
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differentiated, less heavy-handed and yet slightly paternalistic approach towards regulation. The 
overall gist has been one we might wish to call enlightened deregulation: it clearly builds on a 
distinct evolutionary pattern of post Welfare-state regulatory hubris and as such forms natural 
alliances with the administrative law shift towards participatory governance and indirect 
regulation through less ‘interventionist’ means such as ‘transparency’ and ‘disclosure’ – well, 
nudging.74 
 
In Europe, this comparative history is very present. The turn to ‘law and finance’ is occurring 
very persuasively75 and with consequences for the continuously evolving regulatory landscape. 
This landscape is so intricately constituted through a combination of technological advance, 
institutional change and discursive practice that Saskia Sassen is rightly speaking of ‘cultures of 
interpretation’.76  As the European Commission continues to pursue a very effective dual agenda 
of revisiting and expanding the reach of capital market law Directives on the one hand and on 
indirectly reforming company law rules on the other, we find a powerful illustration of the 
emerging culture of interpretation. Making the ‘European Company Law Scene’ one of the most 
vibrant law- and norm-making markets worldwide77 the European Commission has been 
pursuing one of the most sophisticated strategies of indirect, soft-law making by delegating far-
reaching bench-marking and best-practice formulation authorities to expert committees, on 
whose work the Commission has since been issuing far-reaching recommendations that more 
often than not have been preparing Directives.78  
 
These ECGR developments represent thus a series of highly diversified norm-setting processes 
that have been resulting in a veritable explosion of corporate governance codes in Europe and 
elsewhere.79 With the proliferation of corporate governance codes, influenced and pushed by 
international80 and transnational activities of norm setting, discussion and thought exchange81, it 
has become increasingly difficult to identify a single institution or author of a set of norms. 
                                                
74 For a powerful illustration, see now R. Thaler/C. Sunstein, Nudge. Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and 
Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008) 
75 B. Haar, 'Law and Finance - Kapitalmarktentwicklung in interdisziplinärer Perspektive', (2008) 63 Juristenzeitung 
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2006), 349 
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McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and 
Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002); L. Enriques/P. Volpin, 'Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental 
Europe', (2007) 21 J. Econ. Persp. 117-140 
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Proposals', (2007) European Company and Financial Law Review [ECFR] 341-362 
79  See the list of codes in various countries at www.ecgi.org. s 
80 OECD; WCFCG; IVCGN 
81 ECGI, INSEAD, Euroshareholders etc. 
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Instead, the production and dissemination of corporate governance rules has for some time now 
taken on the nature of migrating standards82 and a cross-fertilization of norms is now regarded as 
eminent and necessary in shaping future corporate activity. A distinct feature of this de-
territorialized production of norms is the radical challenge these processes pose for our 
understanding of what we call law proper. With the dissemination of corporate governance 
codes, disclosure standards and rules, best practices and codes of conduct, not only corporate and 
securities law, but also other fields of law – such as labour and employment law – change. It is 
this strangely amorphous space that due to its intricate relation to concrete places such as nation 
states, spheres of political decision making, of protest and so on creates a dramatic challenge for 
attempts to foster institutional conditions for public policy debates. 
 
Loyal to the new institutional economists’ reading, this liquidification of institutions constituted 
by the decentralization of norm producers is repeated, mirrored and reflected in the hybridization 
of the norms themselves. Everything can become an ‘institution’, from a fully-fledged regulatory 
apparatus to a hand-shake among business partners. It is in this sense, that the study of the 
proliferation of corporate governance codes and company law production in general and of the 
rules of remuneration disclosure in particular feeds into a broader research into the changing face 
of legal regulation in globally integrated marketplaces, that themselves become representations 
of society – exactly the nightmare that Polanyi so aptly depicted.83 What shines through 
particular developments in individual jurisdictions in this regard, is a most poignant exhibition of 




                                                
82  See for a comparable analysis of migrating human rights standards, C. Scott/R. Wai, 'Transnational Governance 
of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential of Transnational "Private" 
Litigation', in C. Joerges,I.-J. Sand and G. Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart 
Publishing, 2004). 
83 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Beacon Press, 1944), 57: 
“The control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of 
society: it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being 
embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system. […]The vital importance of the 
economic factor to the existence of society precludes any other result. For once the economic system is organized in 
separate institutions, based on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a 
manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion 
that a market economy can function only in market society.” 
84 P. Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European 





III. THE EPHEMERAL ‘DOUBLE MOVEMENT’ IN ECMR AND ECGR85 
 
The process of European capital market law and corporate governance harmonisation offers itself 
as a case in point for an inquiry into the intricate process of European integration. At the same 
time, it illustrates the nature of legal evolution as reflected in the increasingly multilevel and 
trans-territorialised norm production in the law of corporate governance. On the one hand, 
business has for a long time now come to be organised in a globe-spanning manner, with 
historically strong attempts to liberate itself of nation states’ regulatory aspirations or 
constraints.86 This is part of the nation state’s larger struggle over regulatory sovereignty with 
regard to the economic processes that unfold within and beyond national borders. On the other 
hand, however, corporations remain, in many respects, embedded in a complex field of 
historically grown, institutionally and legally structured frameworks of national regulation and 
administration.87 And, because national corporate laws are embedded in such distinct socio-
economic cultures, historically grown legal and industrial regimes, scholars in comparative 
corporate governance have become increasingly aware of the methodological challenges in 
comparing different corporate governance régimes.88 After early critiques of a functional 
approach to comparative law89 had contributed to comparative legal scholarship’s becoming 
                                                
85 The following section draws in part on P. Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to 
Regulatory Competition in European Company Law', (2006) 12 Eur. L. J. 534-556, and on P. Zumbansen, ''New 
Governance' in European Corporate Governance Regulation as Transnational Legal Pluralism', (2008) 15 European 
L.J. 246-276 [available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145] 
86 C. Schmitthoff, 'International Business Law: A New Law Merchant', (1961) 2 Current Law and Social Problems 
129-153; J.-P. Robé, 'Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a Pluralistic Legal Order', in G. Teubner (eds.), 
Global Law Without A State (Aldershot, 1997); F. D. Ly, 'Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and 
International Self-Regulation', in V. Gessner,R. P. Appelbaum and W. F. Felstiner (eds.), Rules and Networks. The 
Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions (Hart Publishing, 2001); A. C. Cutler, Private Power and Global 
Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
87 M. O'Sullivan, 'Corporate Governance and Globalization', (2000) 570 The Annals of The American Academy of 
Political and Social Science [ANNALS] 153-172; J. W. Cioffi/S. S. Cohen, 'The state, law and corporate 
governance: the advantage of forwardness', in S. S. Cohen and G. Boyd (eds.), Corporate Governance and 
Globalization. Long Range Planning Issues (Edward Elgar, 2000); that ‘culture’ matters greatly, has been 
acknowledged widely, see only B. R. Cheffins, 'Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to 
Milan via Toronto', (1999) 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 5-42; J. Fanto, 'The Role of Corporate Law in French 
Corporate Governance', (1998) 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 31-91; R. Buxbaum/K. J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization and the 
Business Enterprise. Corporate and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy in Europe and the U.S.A. (Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988); K. J. Hopt, 'Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?' in J. A. McCahery,P. 
Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity 
(Oxford University Press, 2002); Á. R. Oquendo, 'Breaking on Through to the Other Side: Understanding European 
Corporate Governance', (2001) 22 U. Pa. Intl'l Econ. L. 975-1027, 976. 
88 David C. Donald, ‘Approaching Comparative Company Law’, (2008) Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. forthcoming, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092452; K-J Hopt, ‘Comparative Company Law’, 
in: (2006) Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 1161-1191. 
89 J. Hill, 'Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory', (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 101-115. 
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much more nuanced, contextualised, and differentiated90, contemporary works place great 
emphasis on the particular cultures of corporate governance norms, the role of institutions, 
policies, path dependency, and innovation.91  
 
“Corporate governance practices are partly cultural and historical products. In 
this context, culture can be defined as the conceptual framework whereby 
individuals, generally of the same country, understand and mediate the 
pressures of the world and motivate as well as explain their actions. As the 
corporation is a meaningful and purposeful human response to economic and 
social pressures, culture clearly informs corporate governance practices.”92 
 
Indeed, the considerably short history of European company and capital market law regulation 
provides numerous illustrations of this observation. In spite of a strong push for streamlining in 
some areas, particularly in capital market law due to increased demands for transparency and 
more efficient management control93, it is likely that national obstacles will continue to crowd 
the route towards a European wide company law94, structural challenges that have certainly also 
held a fully harmonized securities market at bay.95 European company law reflects the persisting 
challenges to European integration in that it highlights the difficulties of creating a body of law 
                                                
90 See for example the helpful study by W. W. Bratton/J. A. McCahery, 'Comparative Corporate Governance and 
Barriers to Global Cross Reference', in J. A. McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), 
Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
91 See foremost M. J. Roe, 'Path Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems', in K. J. Hopt and E. 
Wymeersch (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance. Essays and Materials (Walter de Gruyter, 1997). 
92 J. Fanto, 'The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance', (1998) 31 Cornell Int'l L.J. 31-91, at 36. 
93 H. Davies/D. Green, Global Financial Regulation. The Essential Guide (Polity, 2008), 127; L. Enriques/M. Gatti, 
'EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Law: Do They Tackle Insiders' Opportunism?' (2007) 
28 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 1-33, 2 “At the European Community (“EC”) level, the 
company law reform agenda was almost empty during the 1990s […] Things started to change in 1999, when the 
Commission launched an ambitious plan to integrate EU financial markets through law: the Financial Services 
Action Plan….” 
94 See L. Enriques, 'Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC?' (2005) ECGI Law 
Working Paper No. 53/2005 (November) http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005; G. Hertig/J. A. McCahery, 'An Agenda 
for Reform: Company and Takeover Law in Europe', in G. Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), 
Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004), 24: “…EU Company law can 
be viewed largely as an incomplete and rather ineffective set of provisions.” See already K. J. Hopt, 'Europäisches 
Gesellschaftsrecht - Krise und neue Anläufe', (1998) 43 Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 96-106; K. J. Hopt, 'Common 
Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?' in J. A. McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg 
(eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002); A. Rebérioux, 
'European Style of Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement', (2002) 40 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 111-134; P. Zumbansen, 'European Corporate Law and National Divergences: The Case of 
Takeover Law', (2004) 3 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 867-886; J. S. Knudsen, 'Is the Single Market an Illusion? 
Obstacles to Reform of EU Takeover Regulation', (2005) 11 European Law Journal 507-524, 515. 
95 L. Enriques/M. Gatti, 'Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law After the Financial Services Action Plan?' (2007) 





for social actors who have been relying on national rules, institutions, and customs within the 
nation state.96 This process has nothing but consistently highlighted the immense political and 
socio-economic obstacles growing out of Member States’ different ‘varieties’ and ‘models’ of 
capitalism,97 often associated with substantive costs in bringing about an effective regulatory 
régime for companies operating and investing on the European market.98 
 
Any attempt, therefore, at assessing and evaluating the regulatory goals of the ECGR and capital 
market law agenda needs to begin with the premise that such rules are now developed in and 
emerging from a multilevel process of norm-production. With this, a study of European company 
law necessarily has to take into consideration the impact of different localities and types of 
norm-production on the emergence of European wide rules and standards, but also the persisting 
patterns of political opposition against reform.99 The German rules governing worker 
participation in business corporations have, in that respect, become a notorious example of a 
régime deeply embedded in the country’s political economy. To touch on one part of the legal 
framework would likely result in a turmoil involving numerous other norms and institutions 
governing co-determination.100 Likewise, the long and painful struggle over a European takeover 
                                                
96 See only F. Kübler, 'The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the Securities Markets', in K. J. Hopt and E. 
Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 100-101; N. Reich, 
Understanding EU Law. Objectives, Principles and Methods of Community Law, 2nd ed. (Intersentia, 2005), 349; S. 
Deakin, 'Reflexive Governance and European Company Law, in: CLPE Research Paper Series 2007', in: available 
at: www.comparativeresearch.net 
97 Most recently: J. S. Knudsen, 'Is the Single Market an Illusion? Obstacles to Reform of EU Takeover Regulation', 
(2005) 11 European Law Journal 507-524, 524; see already the intricate critique by M. Rhodes/B. v. Apeldoorn, 
'Capital Unbound? The Transformation of European corporate governance', (1998) 5 Journal of European Public 
Policy 406-427 (reprinted in Thomas Clarke, ed., Theories of Corporate Governance. The Philosophical Foundations 
of Corporate Law (London/New York: Routledge, 2004), 243; A. Rebérioux, 'European Style of Corporate 
Governance at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement', (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 
111-134. For a recent exposition of the “Models of Capitalism”, see C. Crouch, 'Models of Capitalism', (2005) 10 
New Political Economy 439-456. 
98 G. Hertig, 'Western Europe's Corporate Governance Dilemma', in T. Baums,K. J. Hopt and N. Horn (eds.), 
Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law. Liber Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (Kluwer Law 
International, 2000); G. Hertig/J. A. McCahery, 'An Agenda for Reform: Company and Takeover Law in Europe', in 
G. Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe 
(Oxford University Press, 2004), 39-40; F. Kübler, 'The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the Securities Markets', 
in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Capital Markets and Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 101-
103; L. Enriques, 'Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC?' (2005) ECGI Law Working 
Paper No. 53/2005 (November) http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005, 16-22. 
99 G. Hertig/J. A. McCahery, 'An Agenda for Reform: Company and Takeover Law in Europe', in G. Ferrarini,K. J. 
Hopt,J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford University 
Press, 2004), at 24; E. Wymeersch, 'About Techniques of Regulating Companies in the European Union', in G. 
Ferrarini,K. J. Hopt,J. Winter and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
100 See, e.g., K. Pistor, 'Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities', in M. Blair and M. 
J. Roe (eds.), Employees and Corporate Governance (Brookings Institution, 1999); M. J. Roe, 'German Co-
Determination and German Securities Markets', in K. J. Hopt,H. Kanda,M. J. Roe,E. Wymeersch and S. Prigge 
(eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance. The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford University Press, 
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régime did clearly reflect the complexities of a regulatory, socio-economic minefield made up of 
cultural predispositions, institutional traditions (Volkswagen101) and established networks—all of 
which make any capital market law-oriented reformer frown, at best.102 
 
‘New’ or alternative modes of governance have been emerging in response and reaction to the 
regulatory challenges that inevitably arise from these distinct variances in ‘Member States’ 
regulatory design. The most remarkable regulatory innovation in recent years is without doubt 
the so-called Open Method of Coordination [OMC], which, after emerging during the 1990s in 
the realm of politically contested national, economic and employment policies, had been 
formally adopted at the 2000 Lisbon Summit. Its defining feature has been the proceduralisation 
of regulatory governance by benchmarking and disseminating non-binding objectives and 
standards across a growing body of regulatory areas.103 ‘In the years following the Lisbon 
Summit, the OMC […] appeared to have become the governance instrument of choice for EU 
policymaking in complex, domestically sensitive areas, where diversity among the Member 
States precludes harmonisation but inaction is politically unacceptable, and where widespread 
strategic uncertainty recommends mutual learning at the national as well as the European 
level.’104 The departure of the OMC from the more rigid norm-generation and enforcement 
program of the ‘Community Method’ has been both welcomed and criticised.105 What Francis 
Snyder identified as ‘the challenge of sites’ facing the European Constitutionalist project106, 
indeed constitutes the framework for the proliferating norm-generation processes of ECGR. As 
we will see in the example of regulating the disclosure requirements for executive compensation, 
this area of ECGR is marked by a deep, underlying tension between increasingly decentralised, 
indirect regulatory forms on the one hand and vaguely defined and yet broadly conceived policy 
                                                                                                                                                       
1998); M. Weiss, 'Zur aktuellen Bedeutung des Mitbestimmungsurteils - BVerfGE 50, 290 ff.' (2000) 83 Kritische 
Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 405-418. 
101 See the Commission’s move against Germany with regard to the public holdings in the Volkswagen Group: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/410&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&g
uiLanguage=en; for a background, see J. Adolff, 'Turn of the Tide? The "Golden Share" Judgements of the 
European Court of Justice and the Liberalization of the European Capital Markets', in: 3 German Law Journal No. 
8 (1 August 2002) available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=170; on the ECJ’s 2007 
Volkswagen decision, see P. Zumbansen/D. Saam, 'The ECJ, Volkswagen and European Corporate Law: Reshaping 
the European Varieties of Capitalism', (2007) 8 German L.J. 1027-1051. 
102 C. Kirchner/R. W. Painter, 'Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and 
the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform', (2002) 50 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 451-476. 
103 D. Hodson/I. Maher, 'The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy 
Coordination', (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 719-746 
104 C. F. Sabel/J. Zeitlin, 'Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the 
EU', (2008) 14 European L.J. 271-327, at 292 
105 See e.g. J. Scott/D. Trubek, 'Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union', 
(2002) 8 European Law Journal 1-18;  
106 F. Snyder, 'European Constitutionalism in the 21st Century', in T. Tridimas and P. Nebbia (eds.), European 





goals against which the adequacy and the success of lower-level norm-setting processes will be 
measured, on the other. At the same time, EU internal corporate governance negotiations are 
increasingly becoming disembedded from the exclusionary European context as they are 
complemented, irritated and shaped by those norms and principles (‘best practices’ and 
‘guidelines’ that are disseminated on the transnational level, promulgated, for example, by actors 
such as the OECD).107 
 
Seen, thus, under the magnifying glass, ECGR can be described to unfold as a particular open-
ended and contestable practice.108 Even a cursory overview of the emerging features of ECGR 
suggests strong corollaries between ECGR and emerging general forms of ‘new’109 or 
‘experimental’ EU governance110 on the one hand and between ECGR and transnational 
governance forms in corporate and labour law on the other.111 
  
On the ‘inside’ of the European integration process, recent years have seen a tremendous drive 
towards the creation of ever-more flexible forms of indirect regulation, benchmarking and 
rule/standards production through expert groups and advisory committees. As Simon Deakin has 
recently argued112, expert groups such as the European Corporate Governance Forum113, while 
importantly building on recent experiences with the Winter I and II groups and their vital 
contribution to break the deadlock over the Takeover Directive, nevertheless reinforce and 
further accentuate the drive towards a ‘right’ standard in corporate governance regulation despite 
the declarations that many years of debating the convergence and divergence of corporate 
governance standards114 should support the view that ‘no one size fits all’.115 
                                                
107 See the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, rev. 2004, available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/principles_en_final.pdf. 
108 See N. Reich, Understanding EU Law. Objectives, Principles and Methods of Community Law, 2nd ed. 
(Intersentia, 2005), 307: ‘Governance is concerned with achieving this balance between legitimate and illegitimate 
uses of autonomy.’ 
109 Critically: Scott/Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap’, supra; see also K. A. Armstrong, 'Rediscovering Civil Society: The 
European Union and the White Paper on Governance', (2002) 8 European Law Journal 102-132. 
110 Sabel/Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference’, supra. 
111 P. Zumbansen, 'The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law', (2006) 13 Indiana Journal of 
Global Studies 261-312; for a powerful analysis, see C. M. O'Brien, 'Reframing RECON: Perspectives on 
Transnationalisation and Post-national Democracy from Labour Law', in C. Joerges and P. F. Kjaer (eds.), 
Transnational Standards of Social Protection. Contrasting European and International Governance (ARENA 
Centre for European Studies, 2008); C. M. O'Brien, 'Reframing Deliberative Cosmopolitanism: Perspectives on 
Transnationalisation and Post-national Democracy from Labor Law', (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1007-1042 
112 S. Deakin, 'Reflexive Governance and European Company Law, in: CLPE Research Paper Series 2007', in: 
available at: www.comparativeresearch.net, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002678  
113 See the website at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm. 
114 See e.g. J. N. Gordon, 'Pathways to Corporate Governance ? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in 
Germany', (1999) 5 Columbia Journal of European Law 219-241; R. J. Gilson, 'Globalizing Corporate Governance: 
Convergence of Form or Function?' (2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329-357; E. Wymeersch, 'Convergence or 
Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe?' in J. A. McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers 
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Paradoxically, the operational method of the OMC, originally designed to promote greater 
flexibility and pressure to foster a race to the top in social standards, transforms itself in the 
context of the ECGR into an engine towards ‘best practice in corporate governance’. The 
utilitarian, soft-law approach as here employed, leads to considerably different results than 
would have been hoped for in other areas of the OMC. With view to the earlier described 
tensions between different regulatory trajectories of corporate governance – consisting of an 
amalgamation of company law, securities regulation, taxation and insolvency law – the pursuit of 
‘best practices’ is determined by a considerably narrower scope of functional concerns. At this 
point, the goals of this pursuit are fused too fast and probably too uncritically with the functional 
orientation of the post-Lisbon Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda. By emphasizing the 
need to ensure the economic performance and, connected herewith, the integrity and stability of 
financial institutions116, corporate governance as a regulatory field is taken out of the more 
complex regulatory context we have seen unfold over the course of the 20th century.117 
 
As the globalisation of corporate activity and finance undermines any attempt at effectively re-
domesticating corporate governance into the previously contained political economies of nation-
states, the more appropriate conceptual approach would be to argue for the need for a 
transnationalization of corporate governance regulation. In the case of ECGR this would mean to 
first recognise the need for a differentiated assessment of different nation-state regulatory 
experiences and their presently continuing variations and innovations118, which lies at the heart 
of our revisiting Polanyi’s critique of disembeddedness and his positing of the ‘double 
movement’.119 The next step would then not consist in ‘translating’ specific regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                       
and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
115 See Frits Bolkestein, Corporate Governance in the Euopean Union, Speech of October 18, 2004 on the occasion 
of the Inauguration of the ECGF in The Hague, available at: 
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117 See e.g. A. A. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1954); M. J. Roe, 'Path 
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(Getting) Ready for Competition’, (2007) Center for Business and Corporate Law Research Paper No. 06/2007, 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=986357. 
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instruments onto the transnational sphere, but, instead, in fostering a radically functionalist 
understanding of corporate governance. Such an approach would go beyond the now abundant 
references to ‘best practices’, which owe their content more to the ideological battles out of 
which they are emerging than to a truly functionalist governance model. Such a model would 
have to be developed with the complete corporation, its markets, governance structures, 
dynamics and contextual performance practices in mind. Building on work regarding ‘reflexive 
law’ in the area of corporate governance and corporate environmental responsibilities120, a more 
adequate governance approach would have to start with the corporation itself, complementing 
simultaneously continuing assessments of the organisational functionalities of the corporation.121 
While such functionalist approaches to corporate governance are only now emerging122, their 
promise lies in their pursuit of governance models that are evolving directly out of the practice, 
management and operation of complex business entities on uncertain markets.  
 
While this approach would place great emphasis on self-regulation, which would in turn create 
additional pressure on the regulatory systems with a mandatory-law approach to corporate 
law123, reflexive corporate governance would eventually emerge as a more adequate and flexible 
approach to corporate law regulation while – at the same time – not necessarily being insulated 
from ongoing assessments of this hybrid regulatory enterprise. Instead of reacting to the long, 
tiresome and frustrating harmonisation attempts in European company law with a turn to expert 
rule and market governance, reflexive corporate governance would allow for a clearer view of 
how political governance and corporate self-regulation can be mutually reinforcing and 
optimizing by constantly exposing regulatory choices and practices to scrutiny. The prime 
advantage of this approach would be that the regulatory challenges facing today’s transnational 
corporations could be assessed in correlation with the ongoing transformation of the political 
economies in which companies are legally constituted.124 A reflexive approach to corporate 
                                                                                                                                                       
grew to unbelievable dimensions, on the other hand a network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful 
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world commodity markets, world capital markets, and world currency markets under the aegis of the gold standard 
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University Press, 2002). 
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governance is even more pressing as the dramatically unfolding debate over a present transition 
from a ‘real economy’ to a ‘financial economy’125 suggests that neither a return to embedded 
capitalism corporate governance regulation nor a undeterred belief in the ‘end of history of 
corporate law’126 with its dubious promises of triumphant shareholder value maximization are a 
viable option. This means that what would previously have been an interest-pluralist assessment 
of choices in corporate governance regulation with view to allegedly opposed and eventually 
irreconcilable stakeholder interests can now be transposed into a more comprehensive and 
contextual analysis of the corporation’s functions, in particular, of its embeddedness in 
operational and regulatory practices. 
 
 
IV. THE TRANSNATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LEGAL ORDER 
 
A. LAW AND TRANSNATIONAL RULE-MAKING 
 
The recent respective developments in ECMR and ECGR suggest an intriguing transformation of 
the role of legal regulation. While scholars in the different variations of new institutional 
economics127 on the one hand and of behavioural economics on the other128 provide for 
important insights into the sticky nature of institutions and mindsets that shape economic 
development, there has been relatively little attention given to the evolving forms and 
instruments of legal regulation. This is particularly regrettable as a more engaged dialogue 
between law and the named theoretical orientations in economics would likely result in more 
satisfying answers to the questions that seem to stubbornly seem to surround the institutionalist 
explanations of complex situations.129 Where such dialogue is initiated on the part of open-
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minded economists, important insights have been gained with regard to the relevance of ‘social 
norms’, routines and practices that, due to their complex, context-driven nature, are not easily 
fitted into a legal rights regime as applied by a contract adjudicating judge.130 This ‘discovery of 
social norms by law & economics’ scholars131, however, has left some stones unturned. Namely, 
the economist bias in the identification of social norms that underlie parties’ behaviour leads to a 
narrow view on the nature and scope of such norms. By contrast, it would seem more promising 
to take the inquiry into the social foundations of contract law, as Durkheim already early on 
circumscribed his investigative agenda132, further. A decisive step into this direction would be to 
reflect on the connections between the ‘social norms’ that govern business partners’ behaviour 
now133 and then.134 For one, such a drawing of connections would allow us to appreciate on the 
evolutionary character of the legal form. As the studies by Macaulay and others that eventually 
found their way into the famous Materials on ‘Contract Law in Context” at Wisconsin135 show, 
the discovery of informal agreements, routines and attitudes among ‘contracting’ parties was not 
understood as undermining or substituting law. Instead, the importance of these studies has to be 
seen in their authors’ insistence that these findings must be taken to transform and, eventually, 
improve law. Instead of juxtaposing law and social norms, the ‘relational contract’ and ‘law in 
context’ scholars emphasized the intertwined nature of both. The current assessments of social 
norms that govern business people’s behaviour are at great distance from these earlier 
findings.136  
 
As relational contract law sought to integrate the constantly changing and evolving nature of 
social relations into the legal form in order to understand law as relational (or, “social”137), we 
are currently faced with the question how law adapts to or, more appropriately, how law 
formulates legal responses in a fast evolving, functionally differentiated, complex environment. 
There is another opportunity not yet grasped by contemporary ‘social norms’ scholars in the law 
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and economics camp. This concerns the rediscovery of studies in ‘legal pluralism’ and ‘legal 
anthropology’ from the 1970s and 1980s. Such an exercise is promising in at least two respects. 
For one, the legal pluralists and anthropologists contributed greatly to a better understanding of 
the semi-autonomous nature of legal fields: as pioneered in her 1976 article138, Sally Moore’s 
analysis of law being constituted in part by social norms, routines, customs and practices and in 
part by hard legal regulation, the notion of law as a semi-autonomous field proved of vital 
importance in opening our eyes for the intricate relations between the regulator and concrete, 
local, intimate social spaces.139 Striving for alternatives to the at times heavy-handed social 
engineering by the legal machinery, scholars called for extra-legal activism140 and 
delegalization.141  
 
Such a growing understanding of the tensions between ‘lifeworld and system’  (Habermas), ‘the 
raw and the cooked’ (Lévi-Strauss), or ‘core and periphery’ (Sousa-Santos) would soon become 
instrumental in the critical assessment of the role of legal regulation in a highly pluralistic 
society during the middle of the 20th century, which until then had remained very much within 
the intellectual and conceptual confines of Max Weber’s distinction between substantive and 
formal rationalities of law. In his astute analysis of law’s evolution from substantive to formal 
rationality along with the emergence of the bureaucratic rule of law, Weber identified on the one 
hand the stabilizing role of law for the conduct of commercial (and other) affairs, while, on the 
other, recognizing the potentially harmful effects of the ever-recurring anti-formal tendencies on 
the body and practice of law.142 Weber’s sensibility to the contestations, the anti-rational, 
material challenges to the allegedly formal edifice of law turned out to be foretelling of the 
ensuing evolution of legal regulation well into the highly sophisticated regulatory architectures 
of Western welfare states143, plagued by a purposive and intentional regulatory overdrive.144 It 
comes as no surprise, then, that the reflection on the place of law in a canon of voices of social 
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ordering that lawyers and social theorists in North America were concerned with145, was 
somewhat echoed by the critique of ‘instrumental’ and ‘regulatory’ law in an overly zealous 
Welfare State apparatus in Western Europe.146 
 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the responses to the financially and normatively exhausted Welfare 
State147 soon split into progressive148 and conservative149 camps, and this context is worth 
bearing in mind when assessing today’s academic and political proposals in the wake of the 
financial crisis. In the context of the late 1970s and early 1980s, that saw a far-reaching 
crumbling of social-democratic policy and a growing scepticism with Keynesian economics, a 
fairly ambitious theoretical proposal was made that aimed at the resituating of law into a more 
accentuated model of society: in this model, which did not lend itself to a straight-forward 
ideological appropriation, society is composed of intersecting, but separated communications 
that are each constituted by a distinct terminology (“code”). Law was to be understood as one of 
these social systems – along with ‘economy’, ‘politics’, ‘religion’, or ‘art’.150 On the basis of this 
position, Gunther Teubner introduced the concept of ‘reflexive law’, a form of law that would be 
characterized by a crucial exposure to its surrounding systems, while it remained ‘operationally’ 
closed. Due to its ‘cognitive’ openness, however, law must constantly receive impulses, 
‘irritations’ and, relying on its autopoietic nature, formulate legal responses, i.e. continue its 
systematic operation. In the face of the weakening welfare state and the growing frustration with 
ineffective, undemocratic, and over-generalizing and paternalizing regulatory laws, the concept 
of reflexive law was offered to explain the particular challenge and form of legal regulation in a 
complex world. Its not uncontested151 core consisted of understanding law as being taken out of a 
learned institutional context made up of official institutions authoritatively creating state-
originating laws and, instead, to be forced to reassert itself in highly diversified complex 
environments.152 This radicalization of law’s functional orientation constitutes a new stage in the 
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assessment of law’s institutional form, as it has been learned over time. Whereas law is still 
today most often associated with the state, already the legal sociological work at the turn of the 
century153 as well as the legal pluralist work since the 1960s and 1970s (Moore, Griffiths, 
Galanter, Merry, Sousa Santos) should long have undermined this stubbornly held belief in the 
law-state nexus.  
 
It is against this background that the particular challenges facing ECGR can best be illustrated, 
by studying them through the lens of transnational law and, more specifically, through the 
emerging prism of transnational legal pluralism. The connection of observations of the 
transformation of public and private international law towards ‘transnational law’154 and the 
legal-sociological and anthropological work on legal pluralism offers important insights into a 
better understanding of current trajectories of functionally determined regulatory areas. ECGR is 
a powerful illustration of such a functional field, determined both by its semi-autonomous nature 
with regard to its tension between law/norms and politics/market. The latter are powerfully 
evident in ECGR, which emerges through the co-evolution of the different functional dynamics, 
which drive corporate organisation. At the same time, the fast-emerging forms of new corporate 
organisation such as private equity vehicles and hedge funds seem to defy an organisation-
oriented assessment of the firm in favour of a differently positioned analysis of contemporary 
corporate forms. As the ‘end-of-history’ thesis in comparative corporate governance scholarship 
and the Berle-Means paradigm of corporate organisation and its related governance issues are 
revisited and recontextualised155, the dramatic threat of a mortgage-loan meltdown since the 
spring of 2008 points to the need of a comprehensive reassessment of the corporate governance 
approach for an understanding of the financial structures of the corporate form and the contested 
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B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
PLURALISM 
 
Today’s corporate governance regulation, which is transnational and hybrid in nature, is a 
product of the above alluded-to fundamental transformations of regulatory instruments and 
institutions. As corporate law is being shaped by a complex mix of public, private, state- and 
non-state-based norms, principles and rules, generated, disseminated and monitored by a diverse 
set of actors157 and experts158, a closer look at corporate governance serves two purposes: one is 
the way in which the analysis of contemporary corporate governance regulation can help us 
assess the emerging, new framework within which corporate governance rules are evolving. 
Secondly, the way in which we begin to understand the emerging regulatory framework as an 
illustration of contemporary rule-making, we can appreciate the legal pluralist deconstruction of 
formal and informal legal orders in a new light. Building, on the one hand, on early legal-
sociological work by Ehrlich (‘living law’) and Gurvitch (‘social law’), this inquiry revisits the 
core question of any sociology of law, namely ‘to investigate the correlations between law and 
other spheres of culture.’159 Expanding the spectrum, on the other, with a view to legal pluralist 
work by scholars such as Moore160, Galanter161, Macaulay162, Sousa Santos163 or Teubner164, 
contemporary assessments of ‘hybrid legal spaces’165 that are not sufficiently captured with 
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references to local or national contexts, might help us understand better the distinctly 
transnational emergence of regulatory regimes. The transnational lens allows us to study such 
regimes not as entirely detached from national political and legal orders, but as emerging out of 
and reaching beyond them. The transnational dimension of new actors and newly emerging 
forms of norms radicalizes their semi-autonomous nature in the following way: regulatory spaces 
are marked by a dynamic and often problematically instrumentalized tension between formal and 
informal norm-making processes. The much lamented, regulatory failure of traditional, state-
based legal-political intervention into multinational corporations today has long been serving as 
an illustration of the need to develop either distinctly ‘post-national’, institutionalized 
governance forms or self-regulatory, soft instruments of voluntary binding.166 Mirroring the 
complex, hard-to-navigate landscape of border-crossing corporate activity, the proposed 
conceptual approaches are greatly varied. Instead of emerging as a set of coherent regulation 
theories, they range from ‘global jurisdiction’167, ‘torture as tort’ and transnational civil human 
rights litigation168, as well as from scandalization movements including global shaming169, to soft 
law instruments, self-binding norms, codes of conduct and best practices170, altogether 
suggesting an irreversible trend away from ‘government’ to ‘governance’.171 
 
As transnational governance regimes, then, fields such as corporate governance, labour law172, 
capital market law, contract law in general and consumer protection law in particular173 are 
increasingly marked by the existence of opt-out clauses and self-regulation mechanisms rather 
than being defined by enforceable hard-law rules No longer, it would seem, would the legal 
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pluralist depiction of regulatory spheres as ‘semi-autonomous fields’174 be able to provide a 
sufficient starting point for a more comprehensive critique of the existing machinery of 
justice175: today, the original legal pluralist sword might appear too dull to cut through the 
distinctly post-national constellation of regulatory regimes. The opposite is true: legal pluralism 
can forcefully build on its learned lessons in the aftermath times of the decaying Welfare state 
and ‘legal centralism’. While not being able to directly translate the insights gained in those 
contexts onto the transnational sphere, they can nevertheless assist in depicting the multifaceted 
nature of transnational governance. This becomes particularly evident in a context, where in the 
context of an evolving political governance system such as in Europe, claims about ‘private 
autonomy’ and ‘market freedom’ are advanced that seem to echo many of the previous 
contestations of market intervention and judicial activism within the nation state.176 Our renewed 
interest in different meanings of embedded markets is of crucial importance at a time, where the 
financialist paradigm seems to have outrun itself and where, in our search for a new basis and 
framework for public policy177 in a highly interconnected transnational regulatory, post Welfare-
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